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Abstract—This paper presents a new policy language, known as 
functionality-based application confinement policy language 
(FBAC-PL). FBAC-PL takes a unique approach to expressing 
application-oriented access control policies. Policies for restrict-
ing applications are defined in terms of the features applications 
provide, by means of parameterised and hierarchical policy ab-
stractions known as functionalities. Policies also include metadata 
for management and the automation of policy specification. The 
result is a novel scheme for application confinement policy that 
reuses, encapsulates and abstracts policy details, and facilitates a 
priori policy specification: that is, without having to rely solely on 
learning modes for creating policies to restrict aplications. This 
paper presents the policy language, and illustrates its use with 
examples. A Linux-based implementation, which uses FBAC-PL, 
has demonstrated that this approach can overcome policy com-
plexity and usability issues of previous schemes. 
Keywords-application-oriented access control, policy 
abstraction, a priori policy specification, functionality-based 
application confinement, policy usability 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Access controls are typically designed to protect rsources 
from users. In these schemes each process is restrict d based on 
its user identity, and treated as if it is acting on behalf of the 
user. However, this user-oriented approach is insufficient, as 
processes do not necessarily act in the best interest of users: for 
example, as is the case with malware and software vulnerabili-
ties. Application-oriented access controls mitigate this threat by 
restricting the actions of each application. 
Application-oriented schemes include isolation-based 
containers or sandboxes, such as chroot(), BSD Jails [1], and 
Danali [2]. These schemes require duplicated and often 
redundant resources, and limit the sharing of resources between 
applications, which can interfere with natural workflows. Other 
rule-based schemes provide controls over shared resources 
allowing applications to access the same resources in a 
restricted manner. These schemes include TRON [3], Systrace 
[4], and domain and type enforcement (DTE) [5]. Two 
established security mechanisms that provide rule-based 
application-oriented access control on Linux are SELinux [6] 
and AppArmor (previously known as SubDomain) [7]. Due to 
policy complexity, these schemes typically rely on learning 
modes to generate policy. Arguably policy complexity and 
usability issues have limited the adoption of these schemes. 
This paper presents a new policy language, known as func-
tionality-based application confinement policy langua e 
(FBAC-PL), that can overcome many of the policy complexity 
issues with previous finely-grained rule-based application-
oriented access controls, and can in many cases facilitate the 
creation of complete policies a priori: that is, without having to 
first run the program being confined. FBAC-PL was designed 
to express policies based on the functionality-based application 
confinement (FBAC) model [8, 9]. FBAC restricts prog ams in 
terms of the features they provide, using policy abstractions 
known as functionalities. Functionalities are hierarchical; that 
is, they can contain other functionalities for layers of abstrac-
tion and encapsulation. Functionalities are also parameterized, 
so that they can adapt to the specific needs of each application. 
A Linux security module (LSM)-based implementation, k own 
as FBAC-LSM was developed, which represents policy using 
FBAC-PL1. 
II. FBAC POLICY LANGUAGE OVERVIEW 
FBAC-PL expresses functionality-based application-
oriented access control policies. FBAC-PL is a name-based 
policy language; that is, it authorises access based on the names 
of resources. FBAC-PL policy is centrally managed an  can 
simultaneously specify mandatory and discretionary controls. 
Policies include access rules and metadata used for policy ad-
ministration and automation.  
FBAC-PL expresses FBAC policies in three different types 
of policy files:  
• confinements, which specify the sets of application re-
strictions that apply to users and who is authorised to 
make changes to application policies; this defines the 
system wide configuration; 
• application policies, which specify how applications 
are identified and how they are restricted; and, 
• functionalities, which are used as modules for specify-
ing application policies. 
                                                      
1 FBAC-LSM is available as free open source software at: 
http://schreuders.org/FBAC-LSM 
III.  NAME-BASED PATTERN MATCHING 
Two distinct approaches to access control mediation have 
emerged: label-based and name-based mediation. FBAC-PL 
and the FBAC-LSM implementation take a name-based ap-
proach. Using name-based mediation, resources are prot cted 
based on their names rather than via labels attached to objects. 
For example, access to files is mediated in terms of their path-
names rather than the labels associated with the files. Name-
based protection provides the flexibility of centrally managed 
access control policy, as distinct from the management of files. 
Also, the needs of specific applications can be described in 
terms of resources that overlap with the needs of other applica-
tions, and policies can be defined by multiple users, without the 
overhead of managing multiple labels for each resource. For 
these reasons, FBAC is believed to be well suited to a name-
based implementation. However, a label-based implementation 
(although more complex) would also be possible. 
Resource descriptors in FBAC-PL take the form of simple 
patterns. Wildcard patterns provide support for describing mul-
tiple files, directories, IPv4 IPs, and ports using pattern match-
ing techniques. Briefly, these patterns can describe resources in 
the following ways. Files and directories can have sterisks to 
match any valid characters in a pathname. “**” allows “/” to be 
included, which means that subdirectories can be included, 
while “*” does not. This is designed to be similar to AppAr-
mor’s wildcard file matching. IP matching is very simple 
where a direct IPv4 address can be used, or an octet can be 
replaced with an asterisk, which can represent any number. 
Ports can either be a particular number, all “*”, or a range such 
as “6667-7000”. 
IV.  SPECIFICATION KEY 
FBAC-PL is specified using Backus-Naur Form (BNF) 
[10]. BNF is a common method for describing programming 
language syntax and the format of files or information. Many 
variations of BNF exist. The specific style used here is a form 
of Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF), similar to that used in 
the XML standard published by the World Wide Web Consor-
tium (W3C) [11], and is used as described below. 
Policies are defined as sets of rules in the form: symbol ::= 
expression. Where the symbol is nonterminal (variable) and the 
expression is defined in terms of symbols or terminals (literal 
values). Literal values that appear in expressions are underlined 
and italicised. The ‘’ character represents a line feed. A ‘|’ in 
an expression specifies an alternative valid value. Square 
brackets, ‘[’ and ‘]’, are used to group together pa ts of an ex-
pression to define the scope and precedence of altern tives and 
quantifiers. In EBNF,  regular expression characters are used to 
denote quantification. The characters ‘*’, ‘+’ or ‘?’ can follow 
groups, literals, or symbols. The ‘*’ character specifi s they 
can occur zero or more times, ‘+’ indicates one or m e times, 
and ‘?’ indicates zero or one time. Symbols and literals in ex-
pressions are concatenated. Space and white space in policy is 
explicitly stated using the ‘s’ or ‘ws’ symbols, which are de-
fined within the specification. 
 
V. FBAC-PL SPECIFICATION IN BNF 
The specification of FBAC-PL using BNF is as follows: 
confinements_policy_file ::= conf_policy* 
conf_policy ::= application_confinement s confinement_name{  ws? 
active_default  ws? application_policy_location  ws? functional-
ity_policy_location  ws? applies_to ws? maintained_by ws? 
task_with_no_profile} 
confinement_name ::= astr 
active_default ::= active_state s active 
active ::= active | inactive 
application_policy_location ::= application_policies s [file | directory] 
functionality_policy_location ::= functionality_policies s [file | directory] 
applies_to ::= [only_applies_to_users s user_list | does_not_apply_to_users s 
user_list | applies_to_all_users] 
maintained_by ::= application_policies_maintained_by s user_list 
task_with_no_profile ::= task_with_no_profile s no_profile_action 
no_profile_action ::= unconfined | confine_with_restricted_profile | 
deny_execution 
audit ::=  ws? audit s audit_when 
audit_when ::= all | denied | none 
user_list ::= i1, i2, …, in 
 
functionality_policy_file ::=  func_policy* 
func_policy ::= functionality s functionality_name {  [ws? functional-
ity_level]? [ws? functionality_description]? [ws? functional-
ity_category]? [ws? functionality_suggest_when]? [ws? parame-
ter_definition]+ [ws? contained_functionality]* [ws? con-
tained_privilege]* [ws? macro]* } 
functionality_name ::= astr 
functionality_level ::= highlevel; | lowlevel; | baselevel; 
functionality_description ::= "str";  
functionality_catagory ::= category s [misc | file_editor | file_viewer | game | 
network_client | network_server | system_tools | platform]; 
functionality_suggest_when ::= suggest_functionality s [in_iconcategory | 
uses_lib]; 
in_iconcategory ::= iconcategory s "str" 
uses_lib ::= uses_library s "str" 
parameter_definition ::= parameter_declaration [parameter_type]? 
[parameter_automation]? 
parameter_declaration ::= parameter s parameter_name s suggested_value; 
parameter_type ::= ws? parameter_type s directory; 
parameter_automation ::= ws? parameter_automate s [find_path | usede-
fault]; 
parameter_name ::= astr 
find_path ::=  (searchforpathmatching  | searchfordircontaining) s 
string_pattern 
suggested_value ::= resource_list 
contained_functionality ::= functionality s functionality_name( arg* ); 
contained_privilege ::= privilege s operation [s objects]?; 
objects ::= resource_list1, resource_list2, ..., resource_listn; 
 
application_policy_file ::= app_policy* 
app_policy ::= application s application_name { [ws? executa-
ble_path]+ [ws? contained_functionality]* [ws? contained_privilege]* 
[ws? macro]* } 
application_name ::= astr 
executable_path ::= executablepaths path1:path2:…:pathn; 
path ::= nwsstr 
 
arg ::= ws? [parameter_name= ]? argument 
argument ::= resource_list | <default> 
resource_list ::= "resource_descriptor" | {" resource_descriptor"1: 
"resource_descriptor"2 :... : "resource_descriptor"n} 
resource_descriptor ::= file | directory | protocol | port | IPv4 | string_pattern 
macro ::= macro [permission_directory_path s operation_list, s direc-
tory_list, s path_rule_list | permission_ path s operation_list, s resource_list]; 
operation_list ::= "operation" | {" operation"1 : "operation"2 :... : "operation"n} 
directory_list ::=  "directory" | {"directory"1: "directory"2: ... :"directory"n} 
path_rule_list ::= "str" | {" str"1:"str"2: ... :"str"n} 
operation ::= file_read | file_write ... 
file ::=  /str[/str*]? | *  
directory ::=  /str[/str*]?/ | *  
protocol ::= UDP | TCP | RAW 
port ::=  porti | *  | porti - porti 
IPv4 ::= oct.oct.oct.oct | *  
oct ::= ipi | *  
 
s ::=  (space) 
ws ::= [ ? (space) |  ? (tab) | ? (new line)] ws* 
str : String 
nwsstr : String with no whitespace 
astr : Alphanumerical String (a-z & A-Z & 1-9 & - & _) 
int :  Integer 
porti :  Integer (1 – 65353) 
ipi :  Integer (1-255) 
 
Although white space indicated by the symbol ‘ws’ is optional, 
a tab is recommended for policy readability. In addition, after 
optional white space, any lines beginning with a hash (‘#’) are 
ignored and can be used to comment policy. FBAC-LSM is not 
strict about the order of the elements in the conf_policy, 
func_policy, and app_policy expressions as specified above. 
VI.  CONFINEMENTS 
The confinements policy is stored in the directory 
/etc/fbac-lsm in the file confinements.fbac. This file is 
maintained manually by an administrator and defines and con-
figures all the sets of rules that apply to the users specified 
within the file. This file is the system-wide configuration file 
for the FBAC-LSM mechanism. Figure 1 demonstrates a pos-
sible confinements.fbac file. In this example one confine-
ment is specified: a discretionary control. The discretionary 
control applies to the user whose user identity (uid) is 1000 
(which in this case corresponds to the user ‘cliffe’) and is main-
tained by that same user. Using FBAC-PL, adding additional 
mandatory or discretionary controls that are simultaneously 
enforced is straightforward, they are configured in th s file. 
application_confinement cliffes_dac_confinement 
{ 




 functionality_policies "/etc/fbac-lsm/functionalities/" 
  
 only_applies_to_users 1000 
 application_policies_maintained_by 1000 
 task_with_no_profile unconfined 
 audit denied 
} 
Figure 1. Example Confinement Policy 
VII.  APPLICATION POLICIES 
The policies for restricting applications are stored in the file 
or directory specified in a confinement policy. Users specified 
via the ‘application_policies_maintained_by’ value in a con-
finement are authorised to add, edit or remove these application 
policies. Users are not required to be familiar with the FBAC-
PL syntax as they specify policy using the policy manager, a 
graphical tool that creates the FBAC-PL policy and writes the 
policy files on the behalf of authorised users. Users are not 
allowed direct access to the application policy files.  
Figure 2 shows an example application policy file, kon-
versation.fbac, which was generated by the policy man-
ager to restrict the application Konversation. Konversation is a 
graphical IRC client. The paths to its executables are specified, 
then the functionalities describing the security goals of the ap-
plication are specified and parameterised.  
application konversation 
{ 
 executablepaths /opt/kde3/bin/konversation; 
 functionality Standard_Graphical_Application 
  (peruser_directory="/home/*/.kde/share/apps/konver- 
  sation/", 
  peruser_files="/home/*/.kde/share/config/konversat- 
  ionrc", 
  application_libraries_directory="", 
  libraries_fileextension=<default>, 
  config_directory="/home/*/.kde/share/apps/konversa- 
  tion/", 
  config_files="", 
  read_only_directory="/opt/kde3/shar/apps/konversat- 
  ion/"); 
 functionality Irc_Chat_Client 
   (chat_IRC_servers=<default>, 
  IRC_remote_port=<default>, 
  save_received_files_in_directory="/home/cliffe/dow- 
  nloads/", 
  send_files_in_directory=""); 
 functionality Uses_Perl (); 
} 
Figure 2. Example Application Policy for Konversation 
The three functionalities specified are Standard_Graphi-
cal_Application, which is the base-level functionality de-
scribing the type of user interface, the Uses_Perl platform 
functionality, and the Irc_Chat_Client functionality. All 
three were automatically suggested by the policy manager 
based on the iconcategory specified in the konversa-
tion.desktop file and the application’s dependencies. Func-
tionalities for applications can also be specified manually by 
users based on their expectations of the features provided by 
applications.  
The parameters specified for the Irc_Chat_Client func-
tionality authorise Konversation to connect to any IRC server 
on the default IRC port, and save files to a download directory. 
As shown in Figure 2, FBAC-LSM functionalities are passed 
arguments in a fashion similar to subroutines in programming 
languages. This allows the policy abstraction to easily dapt to 
the differing details of applications providing related features.  
 
VIII.  FUNCTIONALITIES 
Functionalities are the building blocks of policy and are re-
used for multiple confinements and applications. Functional-
ities are stored in the source specified in the confine-
ments.fbac file. The names functionalities use follow a nam-
ing convention, where high level and base functional ties use 
mixed case. For example, Web_Browser, and all lower level 
functionalities use all lower case, such as file_r.  
Figure 3 shows an example of a functionality that repre-
sents a high-level program feature, Irc_Chat_Client. As 
shown in the figure, functionalities can include additional in-
formation used by the policy manager to manage and automate 
application policy construction. In the figure, bold text denotes 
policy that can be enforced by the LSM, while the information 
in italics is metadata only used by the policy manager for man-
agement and automation.  
functionality Irc_Chat_Client 
{ 
 functionality_description "An irc (chat) 
 client."; 
 highlevel; 
 category network_client; 
 suggest_functionality iconcategory "IRCClient"; 
 suggest_functionality uses_library "python-irclib"; 
  
 parameter chat_IRC_servers "*"; 
 parameter_description "the remote servers the program 
can connect to to chat with IRC and send files with 
DCC"; 
 parameter_type IP; 
 parameter_automate usedefault; 
 
 parameter IRC_remote_port {"6665-6669":"7000":"194":"9-
 94"}; 
 parameter_description "the local chat (IRC) port. 
Usually 6667 or nearby (6665-6669) or rarely 194 or 994 
(secure)"; 
 parameter_type port; 
 parameter_automate usedefault; 
  
 parameter save_received_files_in_directory "/home/*/do-
 wnloads/"; 
 parameter_description "the directories received files 
are saved to"; 
 parameter_type directory; 
  
 parameter send_files_in_directory "/home/**/"; 
 parameter_description "the directories files to send to 
others are in"; 
 parameter_type directory; 
 
 functionality IRC (chat_IRC_servers, IRC_remote_port); 
 functionality IDENT ( ); 
 functionality DCC  
  (chat_IRC_servers, 
  save_received_files_in_directory,   
  send_files_in_directory); 
 
 functionality general_network__connectivity_awareness_-
 and_common_file_access ( ); 
} 
Figure 3. Example High-Level Functionality Policy: Irc_Chat_Client 
The definition starts with a description, and includes the 
“highlevel” directive to specify, for the policy man ger, that it 
is a high-level functionality. This functionality is assigned a 
category, “network_client”, which is used to group related 
functionalities to ease the process of selecting functionalities. 
As shown in the example, functionality suggestion directives 
can be used to specify attributes of applications that are likely 
to use this functionality. Given the presence of this example 
functionality, when creating a policy for an application, if the 
application has the “IRCClient” icon category specifi d in its 
‘.desktop’ file or it depends on the “python-irclib” library, the 
Irc_Chat_Client functionality is automatically suggested.  
Parameters are also specified, which are used to adapt the 
functionality to the needs of specific applications. The defini-
tion of the parameter files also contains a default rgument 
value that is used when the argument “<default>” is pa sed to a 
parameter. This is similar to a feature of programming lan-
guages such as Python, C++, and Windows PowerShell that 
enables subroutine parameters to have default values. This fea-
ture allows further abstraction in common cases withou  sacri-
ficing flexibility. Parameters can also have methods for auto-
mating argument specification. For example, in the figure the 
line “parameter_automate usedefault” instructs the pol-
icy manager to use the default values when automating argu-
ments. Other methods for automation of arguments exist, such 
as searching for directories matching patterns containi g the 
application’s name. 
The hierarchical containment relationship between fu c-
tionalities enables arguments to propagate to contained func-
tionalities. For example, when an application policy includes 
the Irc_Chat_Client functionality, the value for the 
chat_IRC_servers parameter is passed as an argument. If an IP 
address is specified in the application policy, the 
Irc_Chat_Client functionality will consequently only grant 
access to browse web resources on the named host. Thi  is 
achieved as a result of this information propagatin from func-
tionality to contained functionality until the information is used 
in the definition of a privilege. 
IX.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has presented an application-oriented access 
control policy language, known as FBAC-PL. FBAC-PL can 
express policies for restricting applications based on the fea-
tures they provide, and encapsulates policy details using reus-
able parameterised abstractions. FBAC-PL can include meta-
data that facilitates automation that is not available in other 
existing schemes. A Linux-based implementation, FBAC-
LSM, has demonstrated the advantages of this new policy lan-
guage. This new approach to policy poses unique opportunities 
to further improve the usability of application-oriented access 
controls. 
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